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Abstract
Recent theoretical research suggest that yardstick competition may be biased
by the presence of fiscal disparities between local governments and that fiscal
equalization may help in correcting this bias. This paper provides an empirical
test of these theoretical predictions by means of a laboratory experiment.
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1. Introduction
The existing research on yardstick competition, that is, the use of compar-
isons between administrators of adjacent jurisdictions as a benchmark for the
local incumbent administrator, usually bases its assumption on the existence of
identical or “similar” jurisdictions to be compared.
This idea has been formalized by the seminal paper of Besley and Case
(1995), that presents a model of the political economy of tax-setting in a multi-
jurisdictional world, where voters compare local administrators to overcome
political agency problems. This forces incumbents into a competition in which
they care about what other incumbents are doing in order to maximize the
probability of re-election.
Similarly, Besley and Smart (2007) study political competition between do-
mestic and foreign administrators of jurisdictions affected by shocks in the cost
of provision of local public goods.
If yardstick competition correctly works, that is, if citizens makes compar-
ative performance evaluation across governments in order to understand the
quality (or the honesty) of their politicians, then it would be useful to organize
the allocation of functions and resources to local governments so as to maximize
this behaviour (Bordignon et al., 2003).
A number of empirical papers provide evidence about the existence of tax-
mimicking behaviour among local governments. Among others, Besley and Case
(1995) successfully tested the existence of this phenomenon using U.S. state data
from 1960 to 1988. Bordignon et al. (2003), using data on 143 adjacent Italian
municipalities, found positive spatial auto-correlation in local property tax rates
of jurisdictions where the mayors run for re-election in uncertain contests, while
interaction is absent where mayors either face a term limit or are backed by
large majorities. More recently, Buettner and von Schwerin (2016), using data
about German states and local governments, have provided empirical evidence
of the existence of yardstick competition between subnational jurisdictions in
the setting of local business tax rates.
Despite the large amount of empirical research on the topic, the effect of fiscal
disparities between local jurisdiction on yardstick competition has received little
attention.
From a theoretical point of view, this problem has been recently treated by
Allers (2012) who underlines that when fiscal disparities exist, that is, when
local jurisdictions differ in revenue capacities and/or spending need, yardstick
competition is likely to be biased. In fact, the key to yardstick competition is
transparency and, if administrators’ performance cannot be derived from subna-
tional government output and tax rates in a straight-forward manner, its correct
functioning could be undermined and administrators of richest (in terms of fis-
cal capacity/expenditure needs ratio) jurisdictions have a strategical advantage.
As a consequence, they could extract higher rents than their counterparts take,
and still keep a good reputation or re-election probability, simply because their
counterparts manage fewer resources and can offer services with lower quality
(Di Liddo and Giuranno, 2016). For this reason, fiscal equalization is likely to
increase the efficacy of yardstick competition and remove the yardstick bias,
providing all administrators the same amount of revenues (Allers, 2012).
To the best of our knowledge, there is still a lack of empirical research aimed
to test the existence of the yardstick bias caused by fiscal disparities. The aim of
the paper is to fill the gap in the literature studying - by means of a laboratory
experiment - yardstick competition (Besley and Case, 1995) and the effect of
equalizing grants on the yardstick bias (Allers, 2012). To be more precise, we
will address the two following research questions:
RQ1 - might fiscal disparity among jurisdiction bias yardstick competition?
RQ2 - might central government (CG) transfers improve yardstick competition
among local jurisdictions?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we report the
experimental design, in Section 3 the empirical analysis and its results are pre-
sented. Finally, Section 4 concludes. Descriptive statistics on data used in our
regressions are reported in Appendix.
2. Experimental design
We recruited students from the University of Bari via a mailing-list system.
They were presented with a set of pairwise choice questions; each pairwise choice
is composed of two scenarios, labelled “Jurisdiction A” and “Jurisdiction B”, of
the kind depicted in Table 1. Each subject has to report his/her vote/preference
between the two administrators of A and B on the bases of the ratio between
benefits from local expenditure (LE) and taxation in each jurisdiction.
The experiment was conducted at the ESSE laboratory of experimental eco-
nomics at the University of Bari and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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An overall number of 40 students attended two separate sessions composed by
20 subjects each.
Participants were presented with the same 20 pairwise choices corresponding
to the 20 scenarios reported in Table 4 in Appendix. The time taken to complete
the experiment varied between sessions, treatments, and also across subjects,
since participants were explicitly encouraged to proceed at their own pace.
On average, the experiment lasted 15 minutes. The incentive mechanism
was that the chosen scenario would be played for real. Specifically, in each
section subjects are characterized by an individual tax base and, at the end of
each session, for each subject, one question was randomly selected and played
out for real. Subjects’ pay-off (benefit) was calculated applying equation (1) to
the subjects’ individual tax base. In this way, participants to the experiment
have incentive to detect the less rent-seeker administrator independently to the
amount of benefit reported in the various scenarios.
The average payment made to the 40 subjects was 5.50 Euro. Consequently,
the average payment was around 22 Euro per hour spent doing the experiments.
This is well above the marginal wage rate of the subjects performing the exper-
iment.
Table 1: Representative scenario. In each scenario jurisdictions have three inhabitants.
Jurisdiction A Jurisdiction A
Total tax base BA BB
Tax rate t t
Transfers from CG TA -
Total benefits from LE ΠA ΠB
The payoff in each administration, i.e. the benefits from local expenditure,
is calculated by the following function:
Π = N α (tBi − ρi + Ti) , i ∈ {A,B} (1)
where Bi is the per capita tax base in the administration and N the number of
inhabitants (N = 3), t is the tax rate, ρi is the per capita rent extracted by the
administrator, Ti is the eventual vertical equalising transfer to the poorest juris-
diction, and α is the marginal per capital return (MPCR). Subjects are informed
that t, α and the number of inhabitants, are constant across administrations.
3. Empirical analysis and results
Our main interest is in the frequencies of votes for administrators who extract
lower rent in the different scenarios that involves jurisdictions A and B. To that
end, we construct, as dependent variable, a dummy variable that assumes value
1 when the administrator who extracts higher rent is correctly identified and 0
otherwise. Descriptive statistics on the results of the experiment are presented
in Table 5 in Appendix.
The regressors included in the model are: the difference in the tax bases
expressed in percentage; the tax rate of the local tax, that differs in various
scenarios, remaining the same for both jurisdictions in all cases; the difference
3
in benefits from local expenditure in percentage and the degree of equalization
that can assume value 0% or 100%. That is, no equalization or full revenue
equalization.
We used a random-effects binary probit estimator in order to compute the
marginal effects of the regressors, comparing cases characterized by differences
in the tax base to cases characterized by identical tax bases, in order to estimate
how much the (conditional) probability of the outcome variable changes in the
two cases, holding all other regressors constant at mean. Table 2 reports the
coefficient point estimates of 5 specification of the model, the full specification
corresponds to column 5 of the table. The computed standard errors are robust
to all kind of intragroup correlation, relaxing the usual requirement that the
observations be independent. That is to say, we assume that our observations are
independent across individuals (clusters) but not necessarily within individuals.
Table 2: Coefficient point estimates. Panel probit - random effect - std. errors robust to intra-
group correlation. Dependent variable: vote for the less rent-seeker administrator (binary).
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5
Difference in tax base (%) -0.0179*** -0.0239***
(0.00312) (0.00413)
Tax rate (%) A=B 0.00188 0.0111**
(0.00362) (0.00452)
Difference in benefits (%) 0.000972 0.00703***
(0.00132) (0.00241)
Equalization degree (%) 0.00131 0.00910***
(0.000939) (0.00188)
Constant 0.284* -0.454*** -0.451*** -0.470*** -0.336
(0.159) (0.111) (0.0836) (0.0735) (0.282)
Observations 800 800 800 800 800
Number of Subject 40 40 40 40 40
Log pseudolikelihood -480.6 -510.9 -510.8 -510.0 -462.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the full specification, the estimated coefficient associated to difference
in tax base and equalization are statistically different from zero, the former is
negative, and the latter is positive. These gives us our two results:
R1 - fiscal disparity biases yardstick competition;
R2 - transfers from central government help subjects to correctly evaluate
administrators’ capacity.
Furthermore, the estimated coefficient associated to the difference in benefit
an the tax rate are positive and statistically different from zero. This suggest
that for higher amounts of resources managed by administrators (higher tax
rate = higher revenues) there is higher probability of detection of the worst
administrators since the difference in available resources are better perceived by
voters. Similar intuition also hold for benefits, the higher the difference in benefit
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(higher MPCR) is, the higher the perceived difference between administrators
is.
We used the coefficents point estimates in Table 2, column 5, in order to
estimate the probability that subjects’ preference is given to the administrators
that extract less rent than their counterparts. The first column of Table 3
reports the predicted probability that the less rent-seeker (best) administrator
is detected in the absence of disparities in the tax base. The second column
reports the predicted probability that the best administrator is detected in the
presence of disparities in the tax base without revenue equalization. Finally,
the third column reports the predicted probability that the best administrator
is voted in the presence of disparities and full revenue equalization.
We can observe that the highest probability of voting for the best admin-
istrator is reached in the absence of fiscal disparities (55.2%), this probability
falls dramatically when there are differences in tax bases among administrations
(15.6%), finally equalizing grants seems to partially correct the yardstick bias
(probability of 44.3%).
Table 3: Predicted probabilities.
Variables Predicted probabilities
No fisc. Disp. - No eq. Fisc. Disp. - No eq. Fisc. Disp. - Full eq.
Constant 0.552*** 0.156*** 0.443***
(0.0665) (0.0279) (0.0392)
Observations 800 800 800
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
NOTE: All other predictors at their mean value.
4. Final remarks
Traditionally, fiscal equalisation is considered an instrument to improve eq-
uity, efficiency and stability of public finance. In fact, the primary objective
of fiscal equalisation is horizontal equity among the residents of different ju-
risdictions. Furthermore, fiscal equalization may also correct for inefficiencies
that might arise if households or firms choose their location basing on net fiscal
benefit and may help support macroeconomic stabilization and insure local ju-
risdictions against asymmetric shocks they may not be able to cope with if left
alone (Blöchliger and Charbit, 2008).
The results of our experiment suggest that the presence of fiscal disparities
decreases the probability of detection while equalizing grants seems to correct
the yardstick bias, as suggested by Allers (2012). However, the correction seems
to be only partial. Our results provides new insights on fiscal equalization,
suggesting that it may also improve the voting decisions in subnational govern-
ments. In fact, the presence of equalizing grants may work as a signal that,
combined with tax rates and subnational governments’ output levels, provide a
better indicator of subnational government performance.
It is important to notice that in our experiment we used vertical, discre-
tionary non-earmarked grants. Further experiments are necessary in order to
test the effectiveness of different kind of grants (such as, vertical and horizontal
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equalization; discretionary and formula based grants; full and partial equaliza-
tion, earmarked and non-earmarked grants) in order to test possible different
effects of various form of equalization on the correction of the yardstick bias.
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Appendix
Table 4: Pairwise choice scenarios. In each scenario jurisdictions have three inhabitants.
Scenario
Jurisdiction A Jurisdiction B
B t T ρ α Π B t T ρ α Π
1 30 30% 0 1 0.5 12 30 30% 0 2 0.5 10.5
2 30 10% 0 1 0.5 3 30 10% 0 2 0.5 1.5
3 30 30% 0 1 0.1 2.4 30 30% 0 2 0.1 2.1
4 30 10% 0 1 0.1 0.6 30 10% 0 2 0.1 0.3
5 15 30% 0 0.5 0.5 6 30 30% 0 0.5 0.5 12.75
6 15 10% 0 0.5 0.5 1.5 30 10% 0 0.5 0.5 3.75
7 15 30% 0 0.5 0.1 1.2 30 30% 0 0.5 0.1 2.55
8 15 10% 0 0.5 0.1 0.3 30 10% 0 0.5 0.1 0.75
9 15 30% 4.5 0.5 0.5 12.75 30 30% 0 0.5 0.5 12.75
10 15 10% 1.5 0.5 0.5 3.75 30 10% 0 0.5 0.5 3.75
11 15 30% 4.5 0.5 0.1 2.55 30 30% 0 0.5 0.1 2.55
12 15 10% 1.5 0.5 0.1 0.75 30 10% 0 0.5 0.1 0.75
13 15 30% 0 0.5 0.5 6 30 30% 0 1 0.5 12
14 15 10% 0 0.5 0.5 1.5 30 10% 0 1 0.5 3
15 15 30% 0 0.5 0.1 1.2 30 30% 0 1 0.1 2.4
16 15 10% 0 0.5 0.1 0.3 30 10% 0 1 0.1 0.6
17 15 30% 4.5 0.5 0.5 12.75 30 30% 0 1 0.5 12
18 15 10% 1.5 0.5 0.5 3.75 30 10% 0 1 0.5 3
19 15 30% 4.5 0.5 0.1 2.55 30 30% 0 1 0.1 2.4
20 15 10% 1.5 0.5 0.1 0.75 30 10% 0 1 0.1 0.6
B = total tax base, t = tax rate, T = transfers from CG,
ρ = administrator’s rent (implicit), α = MPCR (implicit), Π = total benefits from LE.
Table 5: Regression sample: descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean SD P1 Median P99 Min Max
Correct answer 800 0.34 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Tax base A 800 18.00 6.00 15.00 15.00 30.00 15.00 30.00
Tax base B 800 30.00 0.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00
Benefit A 800 3.78 4.00 0.30 2.48 12.75 0.30 12.75
Benefit B 800 4.50 4.46 0.30 2.55 12.75 0.30 12.75
Tax rate A=B 800 20.00 10.01 10.00 20.00 30.00 10.00 30.00
MPCR A=B 800 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.10 0.50
Equalising grants 800 1.20 1.75 0.00 0.00 4.50 0.00 4.50
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